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Abstract 
The inconsistent definition of empathy has had a negative impact on both research and 
practice. The aim of this paper is to review and critically appraise a range of definitions of 
empathy and, through considered analysis, to develop a new conceptualisation. From the 
examination of forty-three discrete definitions, eight themes relating to the nature of empathy 
emerged: ‘Distinguishing Empathy from Other Concepts’; ‘Cognitive or Affective?’; 
‘Congruent or Incongruent?’; ‘Subject to Other Stimuli?’; ‘Self-other Distinction or 
Merging?’; ‘Trait or State Influences?’; ‘Has a Behavioural Outcome?’; and ‘Automatic or 
Controlled?’ The relevance and validity of each theme is assessed and a new 
conceptualisation of empathy is offered. The benefits of employing a more consistent and 
complete definition of empathy are discussed. 
Keywords: empathy; definition; cognitive empathy; affective empathy; empathy 
assessment  
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Empathy: A Review of the Concept 
The term ‘empathy’ was coined over one hundred years ago by Titchener, an 
adaptation of the German word Einfühlung (Wispé, 1986). According to Stotland and 
colleagues, discussions of empathy may even date back to “the beginnings of philosophical 
thought” (Stotland, Matthews, Sherman, Hansson, & Richardson, 1978). Despite this 
extensive history, empathy is not a well defined notion. Instead, there are perhaps as many 
definitions as there are authors in the field (Decety & Jackson, 2004; de Vignemont & Singer, 
2006).  
Several problems result from this fact. Firstly, when interpreting research findings 
relating to ‘empathy’, one must first determine precisely what is being studied, and the degree 
of confusion with related concepts. This can make the interpretation of outcomes difficult, 
compromising the comparability of studies (Brown, Harkins, & Beech, 2012; Gerdes, Segal, 
& Lietz, 2010). Secondly, there appear to be differences in the way researchers and 
practitioners conceptualise empathy (Mann & Barnett, 2012), leading to a mismatch between 
the way empathy is researched and dealt with in treatment and education programmes that 
aim to enhance empathy. Thirdly, therapeutic difficulties can arise when concepts are 
understood differently (Book, 1988; Clark, 2010), with some understandings of empathy 
having greater therapeutic effectiveness than others (see Clark, 2010; Nightingale, Yarnold, 
& Greenberg, 1991). These issues, and suggestions for their resolution, are discussed further 
towards the end of this paper.  
While definition diversity should not necessarily be discouraged (e.g., Duan & Hill, 
1996), efforts should be made to draw together knowledge to improve our understanding and 
to reduce confusion in the field.  Although “there is no way to ascertain which definition is 
correct” (Eisenberg et al. (1991, 64), it is possible to compare and contrast how empathy is 
conceptualised, and discuss any differences, examining competing viewpoints in light of the 
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current knowledge-base. The purpose of this paper is to explore the range of current 
conceptualisations of empathy and present a discussion outlining similarities that are 
supported in the literature, and to formulate a new conceptual summary of empathy that can 
be used by future researchers/practitioners.  
 
Identifying Areas of Confusion 
A snowballing procedure was employed to identify definitions in the literature from 
key papers, and exploring avenues of interest from reference lists. This process was not 
intended as an exhaustive review, but was designed to capture definitions across a range of 
different viewpoints. Only English language papers were examined, as there was no provision 
for translation of non-English language sources.  
A total of forty-three distinct definitions/conceptual summaries were identified (see 
Table 1). A small number of these conceptualisations were not put forward by authors as 
formal ‘definitions’, but were summary statements of the wider theoretical discussions of 
empathy. These informal methods of defining empathy were nevertheless reviewed alongside 
the formal definitions as they have the same relevance in terms of interpreting and 
understanding research findings. The present discussion is based upon shorthand 
conceptualisations (definitions) of empathy, rather than full-fledged models, for two reasons. 
Firstly, many models of empathy focus upon the wider empathic process (i.e., the process 
from perception to behaviour), which is beyond the scope of this paper. Secondly, this 
method allowed us to capture a wider range of ideas and theoretical positions, as the majority 
of definitions are presented in the literature without such models. The conceptualisations 
identified are numbered in Table 1; to avoid lengthy citations, in the following discussion 
these conceptualisations are referred to using superscript numbers relating to their position in 
Table 1.  
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---Insert Table 1 Here--- 
 
By breaking each definition down into individual clauses and examining similarities 
and differences, eight themes crucial to our understanding of the concept were identified and 
are discussed below. 
 
Distinguishing Empathy from Other Concepts 
Several notable attempts have been made to differentiate empathy from a range of associated 
concepts (see Batson, 2011; Eisenber, Shea, Carlo, & Knight, 1991; Scheler, cited in Becker, 
1931). Others (e.g., Batson, Fultz, & Schoenrade, 1987; Preston & de Waal, 2002) denote 
empathy as an overarching category, containing all associated concepts such as emotional 
contagion, sympathy, and compassion. To explain why empathy is commonly merged with 
associated terms, Ickes (2003) utilised Scheler’s (cited in Becker, 1931) discussion on the 
related concepts of compathy (shared feelings due to shared circumstances), empathy 
(understanding another’s emotions through perspective taking), mimpathy (imitating 
another’s emotions, without experiencing them oneself), sympathy (intentionally reacting 
emotionally), transpathy (emotional contagion, where one is ‘infected’ by another’s 
emotions), and unipathy (an intense form of transpathy). According to Ickes, such terms 
differ across three dimensions: the degree of cognitive representations of the target’s 
emotional state; the degree of emotion sharing; and the degree to which a self-other 
distinction is maintained. Ickes noted that empathy is located in the mid-range for all three of 
these dimensions, and that the meaning of this term “has an inherent ambiguity that invites 
the kind of definitional debates that have continued since the term Einfühlung was first 
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introduced nearly a century ago.” Nevertheless, Ickes (and Scheler) claimed that although 
such terms are related, there is an argument for their separation.  
Perhaps the most frequent discussion with regards to this theme is the difference 
between empathy and sympathy. Several definitions3, 5, 6, 11, 12, 23, 29, 33, 35, 38, 39 appear to merge 
concepts of empathy and sympathy, or at least do not make this distinction clear, whilst 
others argue against merging  sympathy and empathy (e.g., Eisenberg et al., 1991; Hein & 
Singer, 2008; Scheler, cited in Becker, 1931). Eisenberg et al. (1991, p.65) defined sympathy 
as “a vicarious emotional reaction based on the apprehension of another’s emotional state or 
situation, which involves feelings of sorrow or concern for the other”. The distinction 
between empathy and sympathy has been described as “feeling as and feeling for the other”, 
respectively (Hein & Singer, 2008, p.157; emphasis in original). For example, when 
perceiving sadness in another, empathy will cause sadness in the observer (same emotion; 
feeling as), while sympathy will entail feelings of concern (different emotion; feeling for) 
(Singer and Lamm, 2009). This is consistent with reported differences in the neurological 
processes underlying the two constructs (Decety and Michalska, 2010). Due to these distinct 
emotional implications, it is the current authors’ view that empathy and sympathy should be 
separated.  The emotion of ‘feeling for’ another deserves a name and given its current 
treatment in the literature by many authors, ‘sympathy’ lends itself as the most appropriate at 
this time.   
Two other constructs commonly equated with empathy are compassion (“the feeling 
that arises in witnessing another’s suffering and that motivates a subsequent desire to help”; 
Goetz, Keltner, & Simon-Thomas, 2010, p.351) and tenderness (an expansive, “warm-and-
fuzzy” feeling often elicited by the delicate and defenceless; Lishner, Batson, & Huss, 2011, 
p.615). It is possible to differentiate tenderness, compassion, and sympathy. Tenderness has 
been linked to vulnerability in the target (i.e. a long-term need), whereas the motivation 
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resulting from sympathy is targeted towards a current need (Lishner et al., 2011). While the 
distinction concerning compassion is less clear one suggestion is that compassion is a higher-
order construct, consisting of feelings of sympathy and pity (Goetz et al., 2010). As such 
terms are more concerned with one’s feelings towards the other’s plight, rather than the 
sharing of emotions, they are more closely related to sympathy than empathy (Kalawski, 
2010; Lishner et al., 2011; Nakao & Itakura, 2009). 
 
Cognitive or Affective? 
Perhaps the most discussed aspect of empathy is whether it is a cognitive or affective 
concept. Cognitive empathy is the ability to understand another’s feelings, related closely to 
theory of mind (Blair, 2005). Affective empathy is concerned with the experience of emotion, 
elicited by an emotional stimulus. Some definitions are based upon only affective1, 6, 13, 21, 22, 
23, 36, 38, or cognitive7, 15, 24, 25, 41, 42, components. However, many definitions2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 14, 16, 17, 
18, 19, 20, 28, 30, 34, 35, 37 include both.  
Research on personality and developmental disorders suggests that cognitive and 
affective empathy reflect two different constructs. For example, those with autistic spectrum 
disorder often appear to have cognitive empathy deficits, but average levels of affective 
empathy (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). Psychopathic individuals show the opposite 
pattern (Blair, 2005). Numerous neurological studies have also demonstrated distinct brain 
regions associated with each construct (e.g., Shamay-Tsoory, Aharon-Peretz, & Perry, 2009; 
Zaki, Weber, Bolger, & Ochsner, 2009).  Nevertheless, due to extensive interaction, 
separation of the two concepts has been rejected (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Duan 
and Hill, 1996; Singer, 2006). For example, Lamm, Batson, and Decety (2007) suggested that 
while affective empathy is automatically elicited, manipulation of cognitive elements can 
modulate affective elements. Given the above discussion, an appropriate viewpoint might be 
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that of Heberlein and Saxe (2005), in that whilst the affective and cognitive components can 
be separated, it is important to remember the interaction between the two processes. To give 
another perspective, Strayer (1987) suggested that the affective component is the content of 
empathy, whereas the cognitive component is the process via which this content is formed. 
A further point to consider is whether empathy is necessarily restricted to an 
emotional context, or whether cognitive empathy can be considered ‘empathy’ alone. For 
example, cognitive-only empathy could help therapists understand clients’ thoughts and 
meanings, and teachers to recognise a lack of understanding in pupils (see Rogers, 1967; 
1975). However, although inferring understanding and meaning in others uses very similar 
processes to cognitive empathy (e.g., perspective taking), the lack of interaction with any 
affective processes seems inconsistent with the widely accepted view of empathy as an 
emotional event (explicitly stated or implied by the majority of conceptualisations identified 
here). To avoid confusion, we recommend a different term for such scenarios, such as 
Empathic Understanding (Rogers, 1967). 
Another debate relates to whether cognitive empathy and perspective taking (i.e., 
taking the perspective of the target, adopting their point of view) are the same construct. 
Several authors9, 10, 17, 18, 27, 34, 37, 40 suggest they are. Nevertheless, there are notable 
counterarguments. For example, while perspective taking is important for theory of mind 
processes (Gery, Miljkovitch, Berthoz, & Soussignan, 2009), and is one method of achieving 
cognitive empathy, the two processes may not be one and the same. There are other ways of 
understanding another’s feelings without taking their perspective, such as reading facial 
expression (Besel & Yuille, 2010), accessing relevant memories of previous emotional 
situations (Eisenberg, 1986), imagining events in another place or time (Stinson & Ickes, 
1992) and projection, where the observer assumes the target’s emotional state to be the same 
as his/her own (Nickerson, 1999; Nickerson, Butler, & Carlin, 2011; Preston, 2007).  
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Congruent or Incongruent? 
Some authors have explicitly argued that the empathic emotion of the observer needs 
to be congruent with that of the observed individual 1,6, with several implying this to be the 
case with a “sharing” of emotions8, 16, 22, 27, 31, 32, or “experiencing” the other’s emotions2, 14, 20, 
30 vicariously. For others, congruency may occur but is not necessary13, 18, 32, and some 
authors suggest that the emotion is congruent with the observer’s perception of need or 
entitlement in the other3, 5, 23, thus congruent with the situation. Clearly there is a need to 
disambiguate this issue. 
Some authors emphasise the importance of emotional congruency. For example, 
Rogers (1975, p.4) conceptualised empathy as “entering the private perceptual world of the 
other and becoming thoroughly at home in it”. Within a therapeutic relationship (which 
Rogers was primarily concerned with), one may be able to share and discuss emotions in 
depth. However, even the best therapist will be influenced by his/her own perspective, and 
the degree of congruency will depend upon this influence. Additionally, there are many 
examples outside of therapeutic relationships where empathy is felt without the opportunity 
for deep discussion of emotions (e.g. witnessing accidents), where the perspective and 
interpretation of the observer is the key source of information. Such perspectives and 
interpretations may or may not be accurate, and will be influenced by the observer’s thoughts 
(i.e., projection) and personality (Scheler, 1954; cited in Stotland et al., 1978), and by 
priming effects (Hodges & Biswas-Diener, 2007). Therefore, the degree of emotion matching 
will be dependent upon empathic accuracy: the ability to “accurately infer the specific 
content of another person’s successive thoughts and feelings” (Ickes, 2011, p.57).   
Also arguing for emotional congruency, Hein and Singer (2008) suggested that 
congruency is what separates empathy (congruent) from sympathy (incongruent). This is 
consistent with the idea that empathy is related to the other’s feelings, while sympathy is a 
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reflection of one’s own (e.g., the feelings of concern that the observer holds for the target). 
However, this does not necessarily imply that the other’s emotion is a perfect match to one’s 
own. Levenson and Ruef (1992) argued that without accurate perception it will be difficult to 
respond compassionately. Presumably, however, an individual will respond based on his/her 
empathic experience, accurate or not. Naturally, cases of extreme incongruency, such as 
feeling anger as a result of mistaking sadness for anger in the target, will represent a failure of 
empathy.  
According to de Vignemont and Singer (2006), neuroscientific evidence has yet to 
provide an answer to the debate on congruency, and testing for exact matching of emotion is 
nearly impossible (Preston, 2007).  Nevertheless, the degree of congruency is dependent upon 
factors such as personal experience, imagination, simulation (Coplan, 2011) and the resources 
available for the verbal sharing of emotions.  Accuracy is also dependent on how accurate the 
target is regarding his/her own emotions, which are often used as a measure of empathic 
accuracy (Batson, 2011). If the target fails to accurately decipher his/her own emotional state 
then the task of being empathically accurate is made more difficult for the observer. Each of 
these factors suggests that true empathic congruency will be difficult to achieve. Whilst the 
empathic emotion may be similar to the target’s, it is unlikely to ever be the same (Stotland et 
al., 1978). 
 
Subject to Other Stimuli? 
The previous discussion assumes that an emotional other is present for the observer to 
perceive. With a few exceptions18, 30, 35, most authors make this assumption2, 6, 13, 20, 22, 29, 32, 39. 
However, some argue that direct perception may not be necessary. For example, Blair (2005) 
noted that empathy can either be in response to the emotions in another person or “other 
emotional stimuli” (p.699). Such stimuli may exist in three circumstances. First, it is possible 
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to encounter another person who has just experienced an emotional event (e.g., an accident), 
but who is minimising emotional cues (verbal, facial, etc.). We argue that observers may infer 
emotionality through perspective taking, imagination, or the retrieval of relevant memories. 
Neuroscientific evidence supports this contention as ‘intentional empathy’ (asking people to 
empathise with others) activates empathy-associated brain areas in the absence of emotional 
cues (de Greck et al., 2012).  Second, empathy for an absent target may be elicited by verbal 
statements from a third party (Blair 2005; Polaschek, 2003), retrospectively (Barnett & 
Mann, 2013), and by inference from one’s previous experience (Eisenberg et al., 1991).  
Third, empathy can also be evoked by stimuli about a fictional or imaginary person (Decety 
& Jackson, 2004; Pelligra, 2011; Singer & Lamm, 2009). People respond emotionally to 
emotional scenes in books and animated films, where there are no living entities present 
experiencing an emotion, relying on imagination in such cases. We argue that there is little 
functional difference between empathy for a real, fictional, or absent person.  The key 
element to consider in the presence of an emotionally-laden stimulus is that of perception and 
understanding in the observer, rather than actual emotionality in the target. 
Additionally, a range of different emotions evoke empathy. ‘Negative empathy’ (e.g., 
pain / sadness) is often given prominence in the literature. For example, Batson et al. (1987, 
p.20) suggested empathy is “produced by witnessing another person’s suffering”. However, 
Fan, Duncan, de Greck, and Northoff (2011) identified a number emotions that can evoke 
empathy, including anger, anxiety, disgust, fear, happiness, pain, and sadness. Moreover, 
individuals may not have the same empathic capacity for different emotions (Eisenberg, 
1986). For example, individuals may react strongly to ‘positive empathy’ (e.g., empathy for 
happiness), but dampen negative empathy to minimise personal distress.  
 
Self-other Distinction or Merging? 
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It is also important to examine the internal self-oriented factors. Some 
conceptualisations10, 14, 34, 36 maintain a clear self-other distinction: the observer is aware that 
his/her emotional experience comes from an external source (de Vignemont & Singer, 2006). 
None of the conceptualisations identified here state that the observer does not have this 
awareness.  
The main argument for a self-other distinction comes from the need to separate 
empathy from related concepts. In particular, this distinction is what separates empathy from 
emotional contagion (Decety & Lamm, 2006; de Vignemont & Singer, 2006; Gerdes et al., 
2010; Scheler, cited in Ickes, 2003). With empathy, the observer is aware that this feeling is a 
result of perceiving emotion in the other. With emotional contagion, the emotion is captured 
but the observer lacks this awareness and the observer believes this feeling to be his/her own 
Neuroscientific evidence has demonstrated that observing another’s pain activates the 
observer’s brain areas responsible for pain (Singer & Lamm, 2009), reflecting some self-
other merging. Jackson, Brunet, Meltzoff, and Decety (2006) reported the results of an fMRI 
study that demonstrated others’ experiences are processed the same as our own, but the 
degree of activation in relevant brain areas depends upon the degree of separation ( i.e., 
greater activation when taking a ‘self-perspective’ compared to an ‘other-perspective’). 
Therefore, due to these shared processing systems some merging is evident. This merging 
aids empathy by providing a bridge between the self and other (Decety & Sommerville, 
2003) and without some self-other merging it would be difficult to understand the other’s 
emotion (i.e., cognitive empathy).  
 
Trait or State Influences? 
Over a quarter of the conceptualisations we identified1, 4, 8, 9, 14, 15, 16, 20, 28, 31, 37 denoted 
empathy as an “ability” or “capacity”, implying a stable trait concept. However, others 
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suggest that empathic responses may be context specific (i.e., state influences), using words 
such as situation1, 23, or context8.The trait view implies that some individuals are more 
empathic than others, with this ability being stable across time. Anatomical differences 
(Banissy, Kanai, Walsh, & Rees, 2012), as well as both genetic and developmental factors 
(Eisenberg & Morris, 2001), account for some variability in empathic abilities. Further 
support emerges from studies into the deficits found in autistic and psychopathic individuals. 
Other effects of dispositional factors such as gender (e.g., Derntl et al., 2010) and education 
(Thomas, Fletcher, & Lange, 1997) have been reported. 
Thus, there is little doubt that empathic responding is subject to trait, individual 
difference factors. Nevertheless, considerable evidence supports the importance of 
situational, ‘state’ factors. For example, sex offenders do not have generalised empathy 
deficits, but are able to avoid empathy for certain individuals or groups of people (Fernandez, 
Marshall, Lightbody, & O’Sullivan, 1999). Similarly, violent men have decreased empathic 
accuracy towards their spouses, compared to female strangers (Clements, Holtzworth-
Munroe, Schweinle, and Ickes, 2007). Moreover, a number of situational factors have been 
demonstrated to influence empathic responding, such as observer-target similarity (Eklund, 
Andersson-Stråberg, & Hansen, 2009), how much the observer values the target (Batson, 
Eklund, Chermok, Hoyt, & Ortiz, 2007), mood (Pithers, 1999), blame (Rudolph, Roesch, 
Greitemeyer, & Weiner, 2004), perceived power (Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfield, 
2006), perceived need (Lishner et al., 2011), and cognitive load (Rameson, Morelli, & 
Lieberman, 2012). Thus, the evidence suggests that empathy is a result of the interaction 
between state and trait influences.  
 
Has a Behavioural Outcome? 
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Another contention is whether empathy necessarily has a behavioural outcome. 
Although evidence suggests that empathy is often followed by a behavioural response 
(Eisenberg & Miller, 1987), several authors have argued that empathy has no associated 
behavioural outcome in the immediate sense.  A few definitions2, 20, 28, contain behavioural 
responses to empathy and several stage models of the empathic process contain some form of 
behavioural outcome (e.g., Betancourt, 1990; Marshall et al., 1995). The singular concept of 
empathy, however, is typically located at an earlier stage, suggesting the separation of 
empathy from response behaviours. For example, Polaschek (2003) argued that empathy may 
be felt without an associated behavioural response in cases of competing interests or 
situational factors (e.g., when action would cause danger to the self). Others have argued that 
behaviour is evoked by empathy only when mediated through sympathy (e.g., de Vignemont 
& Singer, 2006; Eisenberg et al., 1999), which is supported by experimental evidence 
(Lishner et al., 2011). Furthermore, helping behaviours can precede empathy, such as in cases 
of emergency (Pithers, 1999). 
The evidence therefore suggests that although empathy often leads to behavioural 
outcomes, this is not always the case, and such behavioural outcomes may be mediated 
through other factors. We suggest, therefore, that it is more appropriate to acknowledge this 
element as being a behavioural motivation (see Hills, 2001), rather than having a direct 
behavioural component, due to those examples of non-action presented above. 
A further point to note is that empathy is not necessarily accompanied by a prosocial 
or helpful behavioural response. While empathy is normally associated with prosocial 
behaviours (perhaps due to lay use of the term; Hodges & Biswas-Diener, 2007), this is not 
always the case. For example, a good understanding of another’s emotions can be used by 
psychopaths to manipulate their victims (Hart, Cox, & Hare, 1995), or used by 
businesspeople to undermine competitors (Hodges & Biswas-Diener, 2007). 
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Automatic or Controlled? 
One final discussion point, although largely ignored in conceptualisations of empathy 
is whether empathy is automatically elicited or subject to control. Hodges and Wegner (1997, 
p.312) argued that empathy, like other states of mind, “can be produced by variables beyond 
our control”. Indeed, neuroscientific studies suggest that empathy is automatically activated 
upon perception of an emotional other (Singer, Kiebel, Winston, Dolan, & Frith, 2004). 
However, empathy is a state of mind that we can reflect upon, control, and modify (Hodges 
and Wegner, 1997), using methods such as reframing (altering one’s perspective or 
cognitions), suppression (not thinking about the situation), and exposure control (avoiding 
emotional situations); all of these require cognitive effort (Hodges & Biswas-Diener, 2007). 
Thus, the evidence suggests the influence of both automatic and controlled processes on 
empathy. 
 
Summary 
The conclusions from the above discussions can be summarised as follows: There are 
functional differences between empathy and related concepts; empathy includes both 
cognitive and affective elements; the emotions of the target and observer are similar but not 
identical; other stimuli, such as imagination, can evoke empathy; a self-other distinction is 
maintained in empathy, although a degree of merging is necessary; empathy is affected by 
both trait and state influences; behavioural outcomes are not part of empathy itself; and 
finally, empathy is automatically elicited but is also subject to top-down controlled processes. 
Based upon an examination of these conclusions, we define empathy as follows:  
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Empathy is an emotional response (affective), dependent upon the interaction between trait 
capacities and state influences. Empathic processes are automatically elicited but are also 
shaped by top-down control processes. The resulting emotion is similar to one’s perception 
(directly experienced or imagined) and understanding (cognitive empathy) of the stimulus 
emotion, with recognition that the source of the emotion is not one’s own.  
 
Consistent with the arguments above, our definition acknowledges the importance of 
both cognitive and affective factors, whilst qualifying emotional congruency based upon the 
accuracy of perception and cognitive understanding. Imagined stimuli are also acknowledged, 
as are the influences of both state and trait factors, and both automatic and controlled 
processes. The self-other distinction is identified but avoidance of the word ‘clear’ leaves 
room for a degree of merging. Although it is to be noted that empathy may lead to 
behavioural outcomes, this definition of empathy purposefully avoids behavioural 
implications. Care has also been taken to avoid confusion with related concepts such as 
sympathy. 
 
Implications 
The purpose of this paper was to raise awareness of the above issues, in an effort to 
develop a more widely shared understanding of empathy. Variations in conceptualisations 
have led to several issues. For example, early measurement scales are often criticised for the 
use of purely affective (e.g., Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972) or cognitive (e.g., Hogan, 1969) 
conceptualisations and for measuring constructs other than empathy (Joliffe & Farrington, 
2006). Using a single definition will enable researchers to develop measures that conform to 
a shared understanding, allowing easier comparison between scales and study outcomes 
(Brown, Walker, Gannon, & Keown, 2013). Similarly, a clearer (and agreed upon) 
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conceptualisation of related terms may allow for a clear distinction between such concepts, 
again allowing us to more easily interpret and compare research outcomes. Additionally, 
better understanding of the themes discussed here may promote research into situational 
factors that contribute to empathy, the range of stimuli that may elicit empathy, and the range 
of emotions that may elicit empathy (e.g., joy, pride). 
Conceptualising empathy and related concepts with greater clarity can also benefit 
practitioners. For example, Mann and Barnett’s (2012, p.2) discussion suggests differences 
between practitioners’ and researchers’ conceptualisations of empathy, perhaps explaining 
the widespread implementation of empathy treatment programmes for offenders, despite a 
lack of research evidence for doing so. Future research could examine the differences in how 
researchers and practitioners define empathy and related concepts, and examine what exactly 
practitioners wish to change/develop in offenders. For example, it might be that perspective 
taking is a greater treatment need than empathy. 
A clear distinction between empathy and sympathy, potentially achieved by clarity in 
definitions, also has importance in clinical education and practice. For example, Clark (2010, 
p.95) stated that there are “qualitative differences” between empathy and sympathy, with 
each of these factors having benefits under different contexts. Clark summarises his 
discussion by suggesting that “a counselor’s awareness of the appropriate use of empathy and 
sympathy has potential to foster therapeutic gain” (p.100). Nightingale et al. (1991) provided 
medical physicians with a written vignette describing a patient who is upset, and asked them 
to respond either in an empathic (“I understand how you feel”) or a sympathetic (“I feel sorry 
for you”) manner. Those taking the more sympathetic approach to practice made greater use 
of hospital resources than those with an empathic approach. A clear understanding of the 
functional differences between sympathy and empathy in medical contexts may therefore 
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have implications in medical education, when trying to optimise physicians’ approaches to 
practice.  
 
Conclusion 
A new conceptualisation of empathy has been constructed based on careful 
consideration of previous conceptualisations, empirical evidence, and arguments presented by 
various authors in the field. Few authors to date have approached this task in such a way. By 
constructing an understanding of empathy through more informed approaches, we can make 
some headway into reducing the confusion that has plagued empathy research for more than a 
century, and pave the way for greater consistency in clinical practice. If empathy is defined 
using a more consistent approach, both research and practice will be enhanced as 
practitioners and researchers will be working with shared understandings of these complex 
concepts. This will allow greater comparability between research findings, promote research 
in often overlooked areas, and enhance the theoretical grounding for clinical interventions 
and measurement.  
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Table 1: 
List of identified empathy definitions 
# Author(s) Definition 
1 Albeiro et al. (2009, p.393) “The tendency to vicariously experience other individuals’ emotional states...an emotional response that is focused more 
on another person’s situation or emotion than on one’s one...[which] can be either identical to or congruent with that of the 
other person involved.” 
2 Barker (2008, p.141) “The act of perceiving, understanding, experiencing, and responding to the emotional state and ideas of another person.”  
3 Barnett & Mann (2013, p.230)  “A cognitive and emotional understanding of another’s experience, resulting in an emotional response that is congruent 
with a view that others are worthy of compassion and respect and have intrinsic worth.” 
4 Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright (2004, 
p.168) 
“The drive or ability to attribute mental states to another person/animal, and entails an appropriate affective response in the 
observer to the other person’s mental state.” 
5 Batson et al. (2005, p.486) “An other oriented emotional response elicited by and congruent with the perceived welfare of someone else.” 
6 Batson, Fultz, & Schoenrade (1987, 
p.20) 
“The other-focused, congruent emotion produced by witnessing another person's suffering involves such feelings as 
sympathy, compassion, softheartedness, and tenderness.” 
7 Clark (2010, p.95) “A way... to grasp the feelings and meanings of the client.” 
8 Cohen & Strayer (1996, p.988) “The ability to understand and share in another’s emotional state or context.’’ 
9 Colman (2009, p.248) “The capacity to understand and enter into another person’s feelings and emotions or to experience something from the 
other person’s point of view.” 
10 Coplan (2011, p.40) “A complex imaginative process through which an observer simulates another person’s situated psychological states while 
maintaining clear self–other differentiation.” 
11 Davis (1983, p.114) “A reaction to the observed experiences of another.” 
12 Davis (1996, p.12) “A set of constructs having to do with the responses of one individual to the experiences of another. These constructs 
specifically include the processes taking place within the observer and the affective and non-affective outcomes which 
result from those processes.” 
13 Decety & Lamm (2006, p.1146) “A sense of similarity between the feelings one experiences and those expressed by others.” 
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14 Decety & Lamm (2006, p.1146) “The ability to experience and understand what others feel without confusion between oneself and others.” 
15 Decety & Michalska (2010, p.886) “The ability to appreciate the emotions of others with a minimal distinction between self and other.” 
16 Decety & Moriguchi (2007, p.22) “The capacity to share and understand emotional states of others in reference to oneself.” 
17 Dymond (1949, p.127) “The imaginative transposing of oneself into the thinking, feeling and acting of another and so structuring the world as he 
does.” 
18 Eisenberg, Fabes, & Spinrad (2006, 
p.647) 
“An affective response that stems from the comprehension of another’s emotional state or condition, which is identical or 
very similar to the other’s emotion, or what would be expected to feel.” 
19 Feshbach (1975, p.26) “A match between the affective responses of a perceiver and that of a stimulus person…. [definitions] must take into 
account both cognitive and affective factors.” 
20 Geer, Estupinan, & Manguno-Mire 
(2000, p.101) 
“The ability to perceive another person’s point-of-view, experience the emotions of another and behave compassionately.” 
21 Goldman (1993, p.351) “A sort of “mimicking” of one person’s affective state by that of another.” 
22 Hein & Singer (2008, p.154) “An affective state, caused by sharing of the emotions or sensory states of another person.” 
23 Hoffman (2000, p.4) “An affective response more appropriate to another’s situation than one’s own.” 
24 Hogan (1969, p.308) “The act of constructing for oneself another's mental state.” 
25 Ickes (1997, p.2) “A complex form of psychological inference in which observation, memory, knowledge, and reasoning are combined to 
yield insights into the thoughts and feelings of others.” 
26 Johnson, Cheek, & Smither (1983, 
p.1299). 
“The tendency to apprehend another person’s condition or state of mind.” 
 
27 Lazarus (1994, p.287) “Sharing another’s feelings by placing oneself psychologically in that person’s circumstance.” 
28 Oliveira-Silva & Gonçalves (2011, 
p.201) 
“The capacities to resonate with another person’s emotions, understand his/her thoughts and 
feelings, separate our own thoughts and emotions from those of the observed and responding with the appropriate 
prosocial and helpful behaviour.” 
29 Pavey, Greitemeyer, & Sparks 
(2012, p.681) 
“The experience of sympathetic emotions and concern for another person in distress.” 
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30 Pease (1995, p.202) “The action of understanding, being aware of, being sensitive to, and vicariously experiencing the feelings, thoughts and 
experience of another of either the past or present without having the feelings, thoughts and experience fully 
communicated in an objectively explicit manner.” 
31 Pelligra (2011, p.170) “The ability to anticipate and share others’ emotional states.” 
32 Preston (2007, p.428) “A shared emotional experience occurring when one person (the subject) comes to feel a similar emotion to another (the 
object) as a result of perceiving the other’s state.” 
33 Preston & de Waal (2002, p.4) “Subject’s state results from the attended perception of the object’s state’’ 
34 Rogers (1975, p.2) “To perceive the internal frame of reference of another with accuracy and with the emotional components and 
meanings which pertain thereto as if one were the person, but without ever losing the 'as if' condition.” 
35 Singer & Lamm (2009, p.82) “An affective response to the directly perceived, imagined, or inferred feeling state of another being.” 
36 Singer & Steinbeis (2009, p.43) “A distinction between oneself and others and an awareness that one is vicariously feeling with someone but that this is 
not one’s own emotion.” 
37 Smith (1759; cited by Marshall et 
al., 1995, p.100) 
“An ability to understand another person’s perspective plus a visceral or emotional reaction.” 
38 Stocks et al. (2011, p.3) “A category of emotional responses that are felt on behalf of others.” 
39 Stotland et al. (1978, p.12) “An observer reacting emotionally because he perceives that another is experiencing or about to experience an emotion.” 
40 Titchener (1909; Cited by Duan & 
Hill, 1996, p.261) 
“A process of humanizing objects, of reading or feeling ourselves into them.” 
41 Van der Weele (2011, p.586) “A basically passive process of information gathering.” 
42 Wispé (1986, p.318) “The attempt by one self-aware self to comprehend unjudgmentally the positive and negative experiences of another self.” 
43 Zahavi (2008, p.517) “A basic, irreducible, form of intentionality that is directed towards the experiences of others.” 
 
